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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD L. STEADMAN and 
DONNA B. STEADMAN, 
his wife, and 
NORMA E. STEADMAN, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
LAKE HILLS, a corporation, and 
M. M. MERRILL, and LESTER M. 
JOHNSON and JOHNSON 
ENTERPRISES, INC., 
successors in interest 
Defendants-Appellants, 
Case No. 
10779 
APPELLANTS' PETITION AND BRIEF 
FOR REHEARING 
Appellants respectfully petition this court for 
a rehearing in this matter on the grounds set out 
below and in support thereof submit the following 
brief. 
1) This court erred in stating that the lower 
court "found that plaintiffs were entitled to attor-
ney's fees." The lower court made no such finding 
and erred in failing to do so. This court erred in 
failing to reverse on this ground. 
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2) This court erred in holding that "the defend-
ants had an obligation to see to it that proper find-
ings of fact, conclusions of law and a decree were 
entered in the cause." 
3) This court erred in holding that "the defend-
ants elected by their stipulation to go to trial on the 
issue of attorney's fees rather than proceeding to 
have a final judgment entered pursuant to the first 
hearing." 
4) This court erred in stating that the defend-
ants were in default under the mortgage. The defend-
ants were in fact not in default and the lower court 
made no finding of fact that they were in default 
upon which to base its judgment. 
5) This court erred in failing to consider or 
even mention the various contentions made by de-
fendants on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A more complete statement of facts is found in 
Appellants' Brief but most of the facts important 
to this petition are briefly given here. 
This action was brought by plaintiffs to fore-
close a mortgage entered concurrently with an escrow 
arrangement providing thirty days grace for the 
annual installments due under the mortgage. After 
a trial on the merits the court rendered judgment of 
"no cause of action." Because the court failed and 
refused to make findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, no written judgment was entered. 
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Nearly five years later the plaintiffs filed a 
supplemental complaint asking for attorney's fees in 
their original foreclosure action. In order to clear the 
title to the property involved to facilitate a pending 
sale, a stipulation was entered into under which the 
supplemental complaint was dismissed and $5000.00 
paid into court pending a hearing on the right to 
attorney's fees. After a hearing pursuant to this 
stipulation, the lower court awarded the plaintiffs 
$3500.00 as attorney's fees without making any find-
ing that defendants were in default or that plaintiffs 
were entitled to attorney's fees. It is from this award 
of attorney's fee~~this appeal was taken. 
By its opinion filed October 27, 1967, this court 
upheld the ruling of the lower court. This court's 
opinion makes certain statements and holdings which 
are in error. In addition the opinion fails to consider 
or even mention the various contentions raised by 
defendants on this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT 
THE LOWER COURT "FOUND THAT PLAIN-
TIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S 
FEES." 
The lower court, in awarding attorney's fees 
to plaintiffs, made only one finding of fact. That 
finding states that $3500.00 is a reasonable attor-
ney's fee. ( R. 77). There is no finding that plaintiffs 
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were entitled to attorney's fees as stated in this 
court's opinion. There is no finding that defendants 
were in default under the mortgage or that the mort-
gage provided for attorney's fees in case of default. 
There is no finding that the successors-in-interest, 
Lester N. Johnson and Johnson Enterprises, Inc., 
had assumed the obligation to pay attorney's fees. 
There is no finding that plaintiffs did not waive their 
right to attorney's fees by accepting subsequent 
payments under the mortgage. 
This failure of the court to make sufficient 
findings to support the judgment is reversible error 
according to past decisions of this court. LeGrand 
Johmon Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 420 P.2d 
615 (1966); F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 
17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, 673 ( 1965); Gaddis 
Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278 P.2d 285, 286 
(1954); In re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 35, 
269 Pac.103, 109 (1927). 
This court inconsistently refuses to grant final-
ity to the lower court's original decision of "no cause 
for action" because no findings of fact were made 
and then upholds the later ruling in spite of the 
lack of findings to support that ruling. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
"THE DEFENDANTS HAD AN OBLIGATION 
TO SEE TO IT THAT PROPER FINDINGS OF 
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FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND A DE-
CREE WERE ENTERED IN THE CAUSE." 
It is common practice for attorneys to prepare 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and a decree for 
the judge to sign. However, the duty to make find-
ings and conclusions rests on the court. Rule 52 (a), 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. In this case pro-
posed findings and conclusions were submitted to 
the court for signature but the court refused to sign 
them until the parties agreed upon findings and con-
clusions. It was error for the court to shift this bur-
den to the parties when they have no power to require 
the court to sign the findings and conclusions sub-
mitted. 
Because no findings and conclusions were signed 
the parties were left to rely upon the court's minute 
entry of "no cause for action". After five years 
delay, during which defendants relied upon the or-
iginal ruling and changed their position because of 
it, it is inequitable to allow an award of attorney's 
fees contrary to that ruling. The principles of waiver, 
estoppel and laches should bar any such award. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
"THE DEFENDANTS ELECTED BY THEIR 
STIPULATION TO GO TO TRIAL ON THE 
ISSUE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES RATHER THAN 
PROCEEDING TO HA VE A FINAL JUDGMENT 
ENTERED PURSUANT TO THE FIRST HEAR-
ING." 
6 
Obviously, to have a final judgment entered 
pursuant to the first hearing would require another 
hearing before the court. The defendants merely 
stipulated that such a hearing be held. The purpose 
of the stipulation was to have the action against the 
property dismissed in order to clear the title to the 
property. The stipulation was not to determine the 
reasonableness of attorney's fees but "the entitle-
ment of plaintiffs to attorney's fees." (R. 55). To 
determine the "entitlement" or right of plaintiffs to 
attorney's fees, it must necessarily be determined 
whether a final judgment should have been entered 
pursuant to the first hearing. 
Defendants did not elect to give up any of their 
rights under the original ruling of the court. Rather, 
they sought only to preserve those rights. If findings 
and conclusions should have been entered pursuant 
to the original ruling of the court, that was an issue 
to be determined by the court at the second hearing 
pursuant to the stipulation. There was no election to 
forego this issue and the stipulation cannot reason-
ably be so construed. Neither plaintiffs nor defend-
ants understood or claimed that defendants were 
giving up their rights. For this court to volunteer 
that conclusion without any findings or conclusions 
thereon, or any basis in the record, or any claim to 
that effect by either party, is error. 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT 
THE DEFENDANTS WERE IN DEFAULT UN-
DER THE MORTGAGE. 
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This point requires a great deal of argument 
for which reference is made to Point I of Appellants' 
Brief and Point I of Appellants' Reply Brief, which 
were overlooked in the opinion of this court. Here a 
couple of observations will be made. First, the lower 
court made no finding of fact that defendants were 
in default under the terms of the mortgage. As stated 
in Point I of this brief, such a finding is necessary 
to support both the lower court's judgment and 
this court's opinion. The lack of such a finding is 
reversible error. 
Secondly, the mortgage was limited by the terms 
of the escrow agreement which allowed a thirty-day 
grace period for the annual installments. The annual 
installment was paid within this grace period so 
there was no default. This contention is supported 
by the authorities cited on page five of Appellants' 
Reply Brief to the effect that the mortgage and 
escrow agreement must be read together to determine 
the intent of the parties, Wallace v. Build, Inc., 16 
Utah 2d 401, 402 P.2d 699 (1965), Strike v. Floor, 
97 Utah 265, 92 P.2d 867 (1939), 17 AM. JuR. 2d 
Contracts§ 264 (1964); the practice of paying and 
receiving all installments through the escrow agent 
both before and after the action was commenced in-
dicates an intent to be bound by the terms of the 
escrow agreement, Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 
205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 ( 1963), Hardinge Co. v. Eimco 
Corp., 1Utah2d 320, 266 P.2d 494 (1954), 17 AM. 
JuR. 2d Contracts § 27 4 ( 1964) ; and any right to 
receive the annual installments by April 15, the due 
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date provided in the mortgage, was waived by the 
acceptance of every installment prior to 1961 aftr 
April 15 (R. 24), McBride v. Stewart, 68 Utah 12, 
249 Pac. 114, 116 (1926). 
In the face of the manifest intent and practice 
of the parties, and the applicable law, it is incongru-
ous and unjust to hold that the defendants were in 
default. Moreover, the lack of a finding of fact to 
this effect requires this court to reverse the lower 
court. 
POINT V 
THIS COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CON-
SIDER OR EVEN MENTION THE VARIOUS 
CONTENTIONS MADE BY DEFENDANTS ON 
APPEAL. 
In Appellants' Brief, originally submitted to 
this court, six separate points were set out, discussed 
and supported by ample authority. In Appellants' 
Reply Brief these same six points were again set out 
in different form, discussed and supported by fur-
ther authorities in order to reply to the contentions of 
respondents. Yet, this court's opinion fails to con-
sider or even mention any one of these six points. 
Appellants submit that each of these points is meri-
torious and sufficient to reverse the judgment of 
the lower court and therefore deserves due considera-
tion by this court. From the court's failure to men-
tion these points in its opinion, appellants can only 
conclude that they have not been given the due con-
sideration they deserve. 
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The opinion does ref er to the lack of finality of 
the lower court's original ruling of "no cause for 
action." But it does not deal with appellants' conten-
tion that this original ruling was required by the 
facts and the law and therefore the later judgment 
for attorney's fees is erroneous. 
The opinion also fails to consider the claim that 
plaintiffs were barred from any claim to attorney's 
fees because of the principles of waiver, estoppel and 
laches. Each of these principles is clearly established 
in this case and therefore should be considered by 
the court. 
The lower court's entry of a nunc pro tune order 
upon ex parte application and after five years delay 
without a showing of clerical error was highly ir-
regular and deserves consideration by this court. The 
same can be said for the fact that the second hearing 
was before a different judge than the one that origin-
ally heard the case. 
Appellants' claim that the lower court's judg-
ment is not supported by the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law is well supported in Point I of this 
brief and in appellants' two prior briefs. This claim 
was also not considered nor mentioned in this court's 
opinion. 
The final point of unreasonableness of the 
amount of the attorney's fee awarded in this case 
also deserves some consideration because it depends 
not only upon the amount of time spent by plaintiff's 
attorneys but also upon the nature and amount of, 
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and the basis for, the judgment of the court. A judg-
ment of "no cause for action" is not a basis for attor-
ney's fees. 
Since these matters have apparently not been 
considered by this court, a rehearing is necessary 
to give them due consideration and to prevent in-
justice. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above stated, appellants respect-
fully pray that this court grant a rehearing in order 
that this court may reconsider its opinion herein and 
also consider the matters raised by appellants but 
not mentioned in the court's opinion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, BACKMAN 
&CLARK 
RALPH J. MARSH 
Attorneys for 
Defendants-Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
I hereby certify that in my judgment the fore-
going petition for rehearing is well founded and that 
it is not interposed for delay. 
